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The Ambivalent Consequences of Visibility
Crime and Prisons in the Mass Media
Leonidas K. Cheliotis
Queen Mary, University of London
l.cheliotis@qmul.ac.uk
Bauman contends that, by dint of its archaic capacity for sustained incapacitation and 
exclusion, the prison makes an appealing triple promise: to render our streets safe again, to 
allow for ontological fulfilment by restoring our freedom of movement, and to avenge in kind 
the immobilisation we have suffered heretofore. This may be true so far as it goes, but one 
can no longer subscribe to Bauman’s consequential claim that prisoners are sent to serve their 
sentences in far-flung ‘spaces out of sight and out of touch–spaces they cannot escape’ 
(Bauman, 2000: 39). Whilst confinement is accurately said to paralyze and evict deviant 
cohorts for lengthy periods of time, prisons and prisoners are truly not so inconspicuous to, 
and remote from, mainstream society as Bauman asserts. Aligning with some of Bauman’s 
own tenets of modernity and post-modernity (e.g., Bauman, 1997, 2002), the present article 
qualifies his account of imprisonment in two closely intertwined ways. 
It is suggested that, owing to the development of the communication media, the prison 
world currently enjoys far greater visibility than ever. Yet rather than fulfilling any pedagogic 
or ‘civilising’ functions, the mediated visibility of the prison couples with that of crime to 
naturalise and perpetuate the physical marginalisation of convict populations. The danger of
criminal victimisation is gravely exaggerated, socially weak groups are constructed as prime 
targets for punitive intervention from state agencies, local communities, and private 
individuals, the prison system comes under severe criticism purportedly for coddling 
hardened criminals, panics are raised over the need for more and harsher imprisonment, 
whilst the imagery of human suffering so caused is either blocked or neutralised. To 
appreciate the appeal and popularity of the emerging continuum of mediation, both in terms 
of content and semiotics, a break is made with discourses premised on grounds of rationality 
alone. A conscious belief in the principles of deterrence and proportionality, for example, falls 
short of illuminating the incessant desire to confront horror in mediatised accounts, the more 
so since such accounts do not reflect reality on the ground. The imagery of crime and 
punishment, it is argued instead, allows audiences to project unconsciously the guilt and 
insecurities of everyday life onto weak minorities of strangers.1
A clarificatory note on method is due before proceeding. The analysis that follows is 
ideal-typical in that it reconstructs the essence, essential similarities, and causational 
interconnections of the phenomena at issue in a form with greater internal coherence than may 
be covered by criteria of empirical truth. For instance, little to no reference is made to the
complexities surrounding the producer-consumer dynamic: the divergent goals and respective 
modes of media production, the polysemy of media texts, the idiosyncracies of audience 
members, and the particular sociocultural settings and institutional arrangements within which 
media messages and the public meet and mesh (see further Jewkes, 2006: 145-147; also 
Banks, 2005; Marlière, 2000). In addition to its convenience for reasons of space, this 
abstractionist account aims to provide a replenished set of heuristic yardsticks in comparison 
                                               
1 On a recent account of the ways in, and the extent to, which a psychoanalytic focus on the unconscious may 
shed light on the effects of the media on audiences, see Carrabine, 2008: 57-75.
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to which future inquiry can be undertaken, whilst at the same time exhorting the reader to be 
vigilant about the possible latent functions of mass-mediated images of crime, criminals, and 
penal institutions. It will also identify and highlight some of the areas –situational, 
substantive, and stylistic– where the need for infusing the public and penal policy debates 
with the craft and science of critical criminology appears to be most urgent.
What could have been
Thanks to the mass media, visibility acquires what Thompson (2005) terms a ‘de-spatialised’ 
dimension. The field of vision, in other words, is no longer constrained by the spatial and 
temporal properties of the here and now, but is rather shaped by the distinctive properties of 
communication media (see further Brighenti, 2007). It is on this ethereal level that the 
included majority interacts and familiarises itself with excluded minorities. In its fully fledged 
form, mass communication flows in both directions. Just as marginalised groups receive 
messages from all over the world, so too the broader community is exposed to messages from 
audiences kept at a geographical distance. No sphere of social interaction is immune, not even 
that between the free community and the prison. As Meyrowitz puts the point, ‘the walls of 
the mightiest fortress no longer define a truly segregated social setting if a camera, a 
microphone, or even a telephone is present’ (Meyrowitz, 1985: viii).
This is not to be confused with a transcendental variant of sociability, that is, with 
vacuous and therefore anodyne forms of social interaction ‘where the heavily freighted forces 
of reality are felt only as from a distance, their weight fleeting in a charm’ (Simmel, 1949: 
261). The mediated overlapping between distant (or close but bounded) locales and the wider 
society may be said to exert an immense and lasting impact on the attitudes of lay publics. No 
value-judgment is implied here. As is the case with all media (in the lexical sense, that of 
agency by which something is accomplished), the mass media resemble a double-edged 
sword. They can be used and abused, they can be empowering as well as disempowering, they 
can be an instrument of direct democracy as much as a subtle means of symbolic 
manipulation and oppression. ‘Media, like walls and windows, can hide and they can reveal. 
Media can create a sense of sharing and belonging or a feeling of exclusion and isolation. 
Media can reinforce a “them vs. us” feeling or they can undermine it’ (Meyrowitz, 1985: 7).
At the positive end of the equation, one may speak of authentic sociability or 
‘communitarianism’, whereby individuals are introduced to broad communities of fellow 
media consumers. In this case, it is not the message that counts as the purpose of mediated 
experience, but the euphoric activity of sharing the ‘global village’ created by the sheer force 
of reiteration (McLuhan & Fiore, 1967). In the content-dependent version of the ‘global 
village’ thesis, the mediated sharing of information and lifestyle options may serve 
progressively to weaken traditional group ties and the social conflicts such ties tend to 
produce or inflame. Thus points Castells to the rising amalgamation of cultural impulses from 
across the globe: from the rap culture of American ghettoes, as it was mimicked in the pop 
groups of Taipei or Tokyo, to Buddhist spiritualism transformed in electronic music (Castells, 
1996; see further Franko Aas, 2007). Within the social groupings so formed, and contrary to 
what happens in typical face-to-face forms of casual interaction, people already share much in 
common and relationships stand a better chance of lasting beyond the initial encounter 
(Meyrowitz, 1985). 
Idyllic as ‘global villages’ may appear on the surface, however, they always 
presuppose subordination to invisible authorities. Hence writes Debord that ‘villages, unlike 
towns, have always been ruled by conformism, isolation, petty surveillance, and boredom’ 
(Debord, 1988/1998: 33; cited by Morreale, 2006). In return for conformity, ‘villagers’ are 
offered identical living spaces, and have all of their needs –from food and clothing to 
entertainment– standardised. It is this ‘fragile perfection’ that they defend, not the right to 
3difference. Villagers have thus ‘dispensed with that disturbing conception, which was 
dominant for over two hundred years, in which a society was open to criticism or 
transformation, reform or revolution. Not thanks to any new arguments, but simply because 
all arguments have ceased’ (ibid.: 21). The question, as Chouliaraki (2006) puts it, becomes 
how to move beyond sensuous delight and develop a reflexive understanding regarding 
distant ‘others’. Insofar as the endgoal is to promote ethical action, the question is how to put 
technological immediacy at the service of sociocultural immediacy in a way that a sense of 
responsibility towards the distant ‘other’ is engendered and sustained. Here the content and 
texture of mediation –the ‘what’ is being represented and the ‘how’– take on a deeper 
meaning.
The highly sensationalised discourse of a ‘universal’ humanity hardly suffices as the 
means, Chouliaraki explains ex negativo. By virtue of its exclusive reliance on 
sensationalism, such discourse does very little to raise, let alone answer, the questions of why 
and what to do to eradicate sociospatial divisions. It rather reinforces narcissistic sensibilities 
and practices, either by presuming that the included already possess a kind-heartedness in 
wait only for specific directions, or by framing ‘others’ as human only insofar as their stories 
reflect our own emotional world (see, e.g., Tomlinson, 1999). Recall Vetlesen’s philosophical 
point that true empathy ‘arises because your pain is yours and not mine, because we are 
separate individual human beings’ (Vetlesen, 1994: 207). Or recall the empirical observation 
Gatrell makes in his historical account of public execution in England: ‘the need to deny what 
was involved in hanging –the choking, the kicking, the witnessed pain– intensified as it 
became more difficult not to think about the process in personalised and immanently 
sympathetic terms’ (Gatrell, 1994: 261; original emphasis). Instead of emanating from 
principle or a higher motive, Gatrell goes on to argue, humanitarianism based in feeling is no 
more than a cowardly avoidance of painful realities. At best, it ‘“[becomes] convention” and 
[is] subsumed reflexively within the codes of bourgeois decorum, often in alliance with 
evangelical earnestness’ (ibid.: 240). 
Speaking ex positivo, the capacities of people to become public figures and connect to 
distant ‘others’ depend on those technologies of the self that tap into their reflexivity in the 
sense of contemplation. For mediation to perform this pedagogical function, it must combine 
the emphasis on emotion with an element of impersonality. The former facilitates the 
spectators’ capacity to ‘connect’, whilst the latter interrupts rather than reproduces their 
narcissism. Impersonality entails the use of deliberative genres of the media in ways that 
foreground the distinction between the spectacle and authentic reality, between hypermediacy 
and immediacy, between the act of watching and the appreciation of the need to undertake 
ethical action. Impersonality offers us ‘a temporality of detached watching and reflection as if 
[we] were part of a public stage–an agora’ (Chouliaraki, 2006: 213; see also Carrabine, 2010, 
forthcoming; Chouliaraki, 2010, forthcoming; Nussbaum, 1992; Wilkinson, 2005).2 In an 
                                               
2 This emancipatory technique is what dramatist Bertolt Becht describes with the somewhat confusing term 
‘estrangement’. Polished and plain at the same time, Brecht’s language is specifically geared towards a 
conscious, reflective distantiation from the artifice of self-evident truths. The actor in Brechtian plays speaks this 
language as if reciting someone else’s words, ‘as if he stood beside the other, distancing himself, and never 
embodying the other’ (Bloch et al., 1970.: 124). The action is often stopped or even frozen into a tableau vivant, 
and much in the fashion of the ancient chorus, songs help the audience contemplate. This is the moment of 
catharsis, when 
‘the specific case in question and the problem of its correct solution can be perceived with 
particular clarity. That is, the beholder achieves insight by means of the estrangement-effect 
which can turn into its dialectical opposite–the recognition, or “Aha!” experience; insight into 
what is closest to the beholder grows out of his amazement at being confronted with what is 
farthest away. … [T]his theatre is no ordinary Temple of the Muses. It prefers being something 
4agora-like environment, ‘[g]roups that were highly admired may lose some of their luster 
from the exposure of the “ordinariness” of their members’, whilst ‘[g]roups that were hated or 
feared … may seem less dangerous and evil–because their members seem more human’ 
(Meyrowitz, 1985: 136); intuitively more human than romantic personifications of ‘noble 
savages’, one should add (see further Cheliotis, 2010a).3
Come what may, one should take care not to infer that mass communication has 
turned moral qualms and the extension of reflexive identification into the normal currency of 
majoritarian attitudes towards social inferiors and enemies, let alone that it has invariably 
instigated welfare and human rights reforms. The remainder of this article focuses on crime 
and prisons to demonstrate how mediated familiarity with distant others may turn into a 
synonym for alienation, thereby forging and reinforcing cognitive classifications and 
respective practices of sociospatial exclusion–the very phenomena which mediation is called 
upon to resolve.
The omnipotent omnipresence of impotence
Television news broadcasts, infotainment programmes, talkback commentaries, films, reality 
shows, internet blogs, radiocasts, daily tabloids, and magazine articles. The array of ‘factual’ 
and fictional media sources that bring the insular microcosms of crime and criminal justice 
into the privacy of our safe and comfortable living rooms is today wider than ever. Richness 
of information, however, is not necessarily tantamount to richness of knowledge (Sherizen, 
1978). The content and aesthetic quality of representation matter at least as much as 
frequency.
With little exception, and in stark contrast to official statistics or victim surveys, the 
media tell us a scary story of huge increases in crime rates, also focusing overwhelmingly on 
violent and interpersonal offences (e.g., robbery and rape). Not dissimilarly, representations 
of victimisation risks are both quantitatively and qualitatively prone to sensationalisation and 
distortion. Whilst, for example, the heavy emphasis on ‘street’ crime is hardly reflective of 
the officially recorded pattern, ‘white collar’ and ‘corporate’ crimes are covered only when 
qualifying as ‘big bang’ events (e.g., the Enron scandal; see Jewkes, 2004). According to Box, 
the market value of public preference for immediacy over complexity is the driving force 
here. ‘[T]he public understands more easily what it means for an old lady to have £5 snatched 
from her purse than to grasp the financial significance of corporate crime’, he explains (Box, 
1983: 31). 
Rafter (2000) helps take our understanding of the mise-en-scène one step further when 
she speaks of a ‘double movement’, from dramas of justice violated to dramas of justice 
undergoing restoration (see also King & Maruna, 2006; Young, 1996). Prerequisite to the 
latter is that protagonists in the former are identifiable individuals or groups weak enough to 
be controllable (see further Hollway & Jefferson, 1997). This, then, is an additional reason 
why the media choose to focus on ‘street crime’ and not on ‘white collar’ and ‘corporate 
crime’. Shady tycoons and financiers are ‘likely to be treated with kid-gloves rather than 
boxing-gloves’ (Sampson, 2004: 243-244), whereas poor young black males are demonised 
                                                                                                                                                  
like a dissecting room, or at least a special laboratory, where the possibilities of right behaviour 
can be dramatically and politically tested and made into models’ (ibid.; original emphasis).
3 Although not deriving from any sort of moral injunction, nor by any means intended to promote the 
‘debarbarisation’ of dominant public sensibilities, relentless media displays of the glittering prizes of capitalist 
consumerist society may demythologise the availability of legitimate opportunities and the fair distribution of 
wealth in the eyes of marginalised groups, heighten minority consciousness, and eventually generate widespread 
clamour for equal rights and consistency of treatment. Meyrowitz (1985), for instance, suggests that the civil 
rights movement peaked as television completed its invasion of the American home, providing ghetto children 
with more points of reference and higher standards for comparison. 
5and punished as perpetrators of violent offences, when, in fact, they themselves are most 
likely to fall victims of violent attacks (Reiner, 2002). 
To the extent that mediatised accounts fail to correspond to the daily experience of 
crime and the need for punishment on the ground of rationality, the immediate question 
revolves around the reasons why they enjoy great popularity (Beckett & Sasson, 2000; 
Sparks, 1992). In lieu of a comprehensive account of alternatives, it is worth dwelling on the 
image of the ruthless young black male mugging the fragile old woman –and here one should 
almost always add, the white old woman– from Garland’s suggested psychoanalytic 
viewpoint. Elaborating on the Freudian theme of ‘criminals from a sense of guilt’ (Freud, 
1915/1916), Garland invites us to explore the possibility of ‘punishers from a sense of guilt’. 
‘[A]n unconscious punitive attitude towards one’s own anti-social wishes’, he writes, ‘may 
carry over into a projected punitive attitude towards those who have actually acted out such 
prohibited desires’ (Garland, 1990: 240). For the root of our desires lies in culture, Garland 
goes on to argue, ‘the most vehement punishments are reserved for those guilty … [in] 
precisely those areas in which mainstream social and cultural norms have undergone greatest 
change and where middle-class ambivalence and guilt are at their most intense’ (Garland, 
2001: 195-196). 
Such an area is the family and the treatment of the elderly in particular.4 No longer as 
tight-knit as half a century ago, families increasingly view the elderly as impediments or 
burdens (Logue, 1993), often forcing them to move out or disposing of them in faraway 
nursing clinics (Scheper-Hughes, 2002). At the same time as enacting or re-enacting our very 
own hostile desires, one might thus surmise, the mugging of the old woman brings to surface 
the hitherto suppressed emotion of guilt. Punishment, in this context, acquires a dual psychic 
defensive function. One is the ‘splitting of the ego’, whereby the reprehensible aggressive 
impulse and the attendant sense of guilt are projected onto remote external objects. This is not 
to say that the process of projection is fully realisable as such. Rose (1993), for example, 
points to the ever-present risk of identification between archetypical opposites (see further 
Valier, 2000; Matravers & Maruna, 2004), not to mention the possibility of guilt due to 
‘bystander passivity’ vis-à-vis the mediated personification of the suffering parent imago (on 
‘bystander passivity’, see Cohen, 2001: 214-216). But punishment –and this is the second 
subtle ‘coping’ function it fulfils– may as well reverse the sense of guilt into a narcissistic 
pretension of ‘care’. Old women, and by extension our parents, may now feel safe enough to 
go shopping, although many amongst us will still mutter in frustration as they block our paths 
on their way. Meanwhile, in a ‘correctional institution’ down the road, muggers receive the 
punitive paternalistic treatment they have always lacked (see further Wacquant, 2001). 
Such unconscious gains account for the compulsive desire to experience and re-
experience crime and punishment in mediatised accounts. What is presupposed here is that the 
media frame crime through the lens of individual and group pathologies, and thereby divert 
attention away from such structural crises as deindustrialisation, economic deregulation, and 
the collapse of the welfare state. It is not simply that structural crises are what usually triggers 
crime–for example, as a utilitarian means to deal with economic ills (Callanan, 2005) or an 
ontological attempt to take control of one’s own destiny (Ferrell & Sanders, 1995; Fenwick & 
Hayward, 2000; Melossi, 2000). Insofar as the crises in question may be attributed to media 
consumers (e.g., for they elected neoliberal governments and opted for the market state; see 
further Garland, 2001: 156-157), silencing the former serves to eradicate the guilt of the latter 
for contributing to the problem of crime. At the same time, the inherent artificiality of media 
exposure to crime helps neutralise the incipient sense of personal danger without preventing 
evocation of it as real and grave. This is because people are afforded the dual experience of 
                                               
4 For an account of how media dramas of crime may be situated within broader discourses on the family, see 
Tzanelli et al., 2005. 
6‘suffering “as if” they were present’ to the horrifying instance and ‘detachment by virtue of 
their real absence from the scene itself’ (Kearney, 2003: 133; original emphasis). 
What follows in response is not to be construed solely in the sense of transference, 
whereby the majority participates symbolically in the punitive wars waged by the state against 
the Other, but also in the dual sense of vigilance and vigilantism. Alongside telling us how to 
think and feel, that is, the media dictate the way in which we should conduct ourselves. 
Witness how The Sunday Times, not your usual tabloid, deploy the ethological discourse of 
territoriality to urge the expansion of collective natural surveillance: 
‘Time and again it has been shown that when the people make a definite decision to take back 
their communities, there is little room for hoodlums. The concept behind the neighbourhood 
watch schemes is based on this very principle. But for the principle to work, it requires a 
concerted and determined effort from all members of a community to agree to take on the 
challenge and come to the defence of another who is under attack. Street by street, neighbourhood 
by neighbourhood and town by town, we can claim back our communities’ (The Sunday Times, 27 
April 2003). 
Worse still, as Evans (2003) shows in her analysis of so-called Residents Against Paedophiles
in Portsmouth, England, the media may play a major role in inciting a ‘vigilante state of 
mind’. Following the murder of Sarah Payne, Evans explains, the tabloid News of the World
launched a ‘name and shame’ campaign for the importation of Megan’s Law from the US. 
Largely as a result of this, protestors marched, waved banners, torched cars, and firebombed 
flats where suspected paedophiles were thought to reside, whilst innocent members of the 
community were forced to flee. Interestingly, Evans reports that many of the female 
protestors felt their own parental adequacy was being questioned by a political establishment 
content to blame single mothers for the problems of deviant youth.
All the while, whether by the moral authority of candid reporting or in the name of 
infotainment, the media are quick to penetrate and debunk the inner world of criminal justice 
agencies. Here, too, imagination tends to be taken on a sensorial journey into spaces where 
the false and the fictional arise victorious on the ashes of the real. Prisons are most usually 
typecast either as dark institutions of perpetual horror and virulent vandalism or idyllic 
holiday camps offering in-cell television and gourmet cuisine on the back of taxpayers. 
Prisoners, for their part, are portrayed as degenerate beasts beyond redemption or undeserving 
layabouts (Jewkes, 2007; Carrabine, 2010, forthcoming). American prison drama Oz, for 
instance, ‘presents a vision of hell on earth in which inmates are so depraved and vicious that 
no sane person could possibly think they should ever again be let loose upon society’ 
(Rapping, 2003: 81; see also Mason, 2003; Jarvis, 2006). But prison workers, noble and good-
hearted as they generally are, appear vulnerable to discretionary failings that put public 
security at risk (see, e.g., Freeman, 1998). 
The emerging paradox one may call ‘the omnipotent omnipresence of impotence’. 
Rather than undermining the external legitimacy of prisons, and despite endangering 
professional careers, media representations reinforce public perceptions of the overall 
essentialness of the prison institution and of the essentialness of its further growth and 
harshening. Panopticism, the situation where the few see the many, owes its existence and 
ascendancy to its very mirror image that is synopticism, an equally malleable situation where 
the many see and contemplate the few (Mathiesen, 1997: 219). It is not just that prisoner 
misrepresentations serve subtly to sanction and naturalise our cultural aversions and hawkish 
reactions to Otherness (see, e.g., Greer & Jewkes, 2005; Melossi, 2000; Nellis, 2006). Whilst 
corruption, racism, and other forms of professional deviance are typically set within a ‘one-
bad-apple’ framework, ‘whereby the exposure of individual wrongdoing is interpreted as a 
testimony to the integrity of the system which dealt with it’ (Reiner, 2002: 387), institutional 
7disorder, laxity in prison administration, and discretionary failings associated with high-
profile cases of reoffending are all slanted as consequences of unwarranted experimentation 
with dangersome breeds of liberalism.
But insofar as condemnations and punishments do not follow logically from crime and 
deviance, they do not intrinsically embody aspirations of a crime-free society and perfectly 
orderly prisons. To put the point differently, the unconscious functions of punishment may 
only be served so long as there is a continuous supply of ‘suitable enemies’. Though no 
politician worth his salt would ever risk making such promise, science fiction films provide 
audiences with reassurance: ‘prisons of the future will be hellish places, and … there will 
surely be villains bad enough to justify their existence’ (Nellis, 2006: 223). 
No sympathy for the devil (unless she wears Prada)
What of sympathy towards prisoners and their lot? Has it been precluded by safety concerns, 
righteous furor, and vindictive sentiments? Or is it that we tend to discard messages that 
challenge the political correctness of our actions and inactions (Surette, 1998)? Is it perhaps
that the authenticity of distant realities is subject to doubt when brought to us by the media 
(Chouliaraki, 2006)? Could it be instead that reflecting the theatricalised condition of 
suffering in the mirror of our own psychological portraits is bound to confine agency ‘in the 
gasp or the shedding of a tear, bringing the possibility of action at a distance to a stop’?  
(ibid.: 210). Or is it that repeated exposure to maladies wearies us emotionally and 
desensitises us morally (Cohen, 2001)? Or is it simply that we feel practically unable to lend a 
hand of help to distant sufferers (Tester, 2001)?
Paradoxically, adopting any of the accounts above would be unduly optimistic in that 
they presume an adequate degree of reciprocity of virtual vision. Not that visibility and 
visibility alone would suffice to incite empathic emotions and sympathetic interventions (for 
pertinent discussions see, amongst others, Nellis, 1988; Wilson & O’Sullivan, 2005; 
Cheliotis, 2010b). But how is it possible to charge the public with denial or indifference to 
prisoners’ hardships, when access to those hardships tends to be restricted to occasional 
televised snapshots or single-columned bulletins tucked away in the inside pages of a ‘lefty’ 
newspaper? Death row in the US, for example, is a place ‘“outside of life and death”: a 
spectral place where prisoners wait invisibly until they reappear in the announcement of their
execution on the nightly news’ (Tessler, 2010, forthcoming). Turning to the act of judicial 
killing itself, in the same way that ‘the distancing of the executioners from their victims has 
been facilitated at the scene of the execution by the erection of a brick wall which separates 
the condemned from the technicians, and permits the fatal dose to be administered through a 
tiny opening in the wall’, the televisual sublimation of suffering reflects the formal properties 
of punitive action: ‘its privatisation, its sanitisation, and the careful denial of its own violence’
(Garland, 1990: 244-245). If not equated with merciful euthanasia, mass-mediated judicial 
killing at least carries no obvious vindictive weight. One way or another, the narcissistic 
binary between the ‘civilised and the savage’ is further reaffirmed (Sarat, 2002: 82; see also 
Greer, 2006).
Lest reverie, faulty memory, or a short attention span still lead one astray, here is 
another reminder about confinement: communication is not dialogical, but monological. It 
‘almost always flows in one direction, inmates being forbidden to transmit information back 
to the world outside’ (Jewkes, 2002: 108; but see also Johnson, 2010, forthcoming; Nellis, 
2010, forthcoming; Tessler, 2010, forthcoming). To be sure, there can be no sympathy for a 
folk devil whose hell one barely sees. Nor can there be any sympathy for a devil who, for all 
we know, resides incorrigible in paradisiacal quarters, threatening by his very existence to 
turn the lives of the benign into living hells. Thus says Jewkes of prisoners and their doom: 
‘[F]or so long have the press and television media […] constructed [them] as stigmatised 
8“others”, that the possibilities for empathy have closed down to all but those who have 
experienced incarceration, or have some other relevant experience on which to draw’ (Jewkes, 
2006: 151). 
There is a glaring exception to all this, if one that justifies the rule. Not unlike life on 
the outside, prisoner life is subject to a process of hierarchisation according to levels of 
newsworthiness and morality. ‘Celebrity’ prisoners, that is, are more likely to meet the market 
‘threshold’ for mass-mediated visibility than their run-of-the-mill counterparts, whilst those 
whom we may call famous celebrities in the sense of stardom are more likely to receive 
empathic representation than celebrities infamous in the sense of criminal notoriety. By 
contrast with the hundreds of ‘anonymous’ men, women, and children who slash their wrists 
or hang themselves in utter desperation behind the bars of a prison, the attempted suicide of 
Ian Huntley and the suicides of Fred West and Harold Shipman were reported throughout the 
popular press (Jewkes, 2006; see also Jewkes, 2004, 2007; Mason, 2008). But they were 
never treated as so worthy of reflection as the roseate 23-day jail sentence of nouveau ‘dumb 
blonde’ celebrity Paris Hilton for driving with a suspended licence. 
Before jetting off to Maui just days after her stint in jail, hotel heiress Hilton found the 
time –an entire hour!– to philosophise on CNN’s Larry King Live: ‘I feel like God does make 
everything happen for a reason. And [prison] gave me, you know, a time-out in life to really 
find out what’s important and what I want to do, figuring out who I am’. Later on, after firmly 
reassuring the nail-biting world that she did not lose weight, Hilton was talked into reading 
out an excerpt from the daily journal she religiously kept behind bars: ‘[Imprisonment] is a 
process, a gift and a journey, and if we can travel it alone, although the road may be rough at 
the beginning, you find an ability to walk it. A way to start fresh again. It’s neither a downfall 
nor a failure, but a new beginning’ (www.cnn.com/2007/SHOWBIZ/TV/06/27/king.hilton.transcript). 
The contemplative spectators could now sigh twice in relief. Not only was the prison proven 
capable of delivering its harsh but righteous task, it also cleansed the character flaws of the 
ideal ego–as this is what celebrities have become in an age of ‘broken narratives’ (J. Young, 
2007: 184-187).
Concluding remarks
The overwhelming majority of people have no direct knowledge of the worlds of crime and 
criminal justice. Save for criminal justice professionals, lawbreakers and their ‘significant 
others’, victims, and social researchers grappling with pertinent issues, the rest cannot but 
glean information solely from mass-mediated representations (Surette, 1998; Bennett, 2006; 
Cheatwood, 1998; Rafter, 2007; Wilson, 2003; Wilson & O’Sullivan, 2004). Alas, rather than 
cultivating communitarianism and deliberative democracy, the media play upon public fears 
by overstating the danger of criminal victimisation, targeting weak and marginalised swathes 
of the population, criticising the authorities for laxity, calling for more and harsher punitive 
measures, and blocking or neutralising the imagery of human suffering thereby caused. Whilst 
a detailed discussion of the reasons lying behind the stance of the media stretches beyond the 
scope of the present article, some general programmatic thoughts are offered in this section by 
way of epilogue.  
The easy explanation would be that media networks promote their financial interests 
by providing the public with what it really wants. Bauman argues that, if media outlets are to 
pursue their economic interests successfully, they need to be fed by public attitudes at least to 
the same extent as they feed them. ‘If television leads the world’, he writes, ‘it is because it 
follows it; if it manages to disseminate new patterns of life, it is because it replicates such 
patterns in its own mode of being’. There is no point in wrangling over what comes first, 
Bauman concludes (Bauman, 2002: 161). Bourdieu appears to be more decisive. If, he claims, 
the media were oriented even slightly towards symbolic revolution, audiences themselves 
9would rush to put a halt to it. Not that audiences ever have to express their wish directly. The 
model of economic competition ensures that the media confirm what people already know
and leave their mental structures intact (Bourdieu, 1998; see also Kitzinger, 2004). Hilton’s 
appearance as a penitent Magdalene, for example, nearly tripled King’s usual audience, from 
an average 1.1 million to 3.2 million viewers. That it replaced a planned interview with
guerilla filmmaker Michael Moore comes as no surprise.
To contend that economic interests lie behind the mass-mediated production of 
profound political effects is not to subscribe to what Bourdieu refers to as the ‘half-baked 
version of materialism, associated with Marxism, [which] condemns without shedding light 
anywhere and ultimately explains nothing’ (Bourdieu, 1998: 39). Media networks and their 
staff compete, not just for economic capital (i.e., money or assets that can be tuned into 
money), but for its intangible, cultural equivalent as well (e.g., educational credentials and 
claims to expert knowledge). This bifurcated model helps account for the ongoing tension 
between culturally rich but economically starved journalism of an alternative or literary 
orientation, on the one hand, and culturally poor but economically rich market journalism, on 
the other (Benson, 2006). Accumulating both forms of capital, as in the case of Le Monde, the 
New York Times, or the Wall Street Journal, allows one to wield economic and symbolic 
power over the entire field and even lay down the rules of practice therein. 
And yet, as Bourdieu himself admits, whilst the media constitute a microcosm with its 
own laws, these laws are defined both by its position in the world at large and by the 
attractions and repulsions to which it is subject from other such microcosms. Consider, for 
example, ‘economic censorship’, whereby the management of media is determined by large
corporations and conglomerates that own or finance the networks at issue (Bourdieu, 1998:
16). Consider also ‘political censorship’, whereby governments make appointments to senior 
public broadcasting management positions (ibid.: 15), or introduce policies that subjugate the 
independence of journalism to market principles (e.g., by tying funding to ratings and profit to 
advertising; see further Edwards & Cromwell, 2006; Golding & Murdock, 2000; Marlière, 
2000; Mathiesen, 1997; McQueen, 1998; Oborne, 2007; Ruggiero, 2000; Sampson, 2004; 
Surette, 1997). 
But why the need to censor the media if all they are forced to do is offer people what 
they desire? If one were to accept that an increasing number of media outlets would otherwise 
deviate from the norm of distortion and sensationalisation, the question is why not? What is at 
stake? Here it is apposite to recall the model proposed by Herman and Chomsky. Theirs is an 
invitation to take a step back and reconsider the degree to which the offerings of the 
commercialised media reflect the preferences and free choices of the public. 
‘Polls regularly show that the public would like more news, documentaries, and other information, 
and less sex, violence, and other entertainment, even as they do listen to and watch the latter. 
There is little reason to believe that they would not like to understand why they are working 
harder with stagnant or declining incomes, have inadequate medical care at high costs, and what is 
being done in their name all over the world. If they are not getting much information on these 
topics, [it is because] the sovereigns who control the media choose not to offer such material’ 
(Herman & Chomsky, 1988/2002: xviii-xix; see also Chomsky, 1991/2002). 
Unlike Bourdieu, Herman and Chomsky seem to dismiss the possibility that, once drawn into 
a hegemonic fallacy, the public might well insulate itself from associative connections with 
information traumatic to the self. Their model is nevertheless valuable in that it points 
emphatically to the role of the mass media in forming public opinion in the first instance so as 
to promote eventually the powerful interests that control and finance them. It is in this spirit
that Hall et al. (1978) argue that sensationalised media reporting, on the one hand, and harsh 
penal measures by the state and its agencies, on the other hand, combine to displace mass 
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economic and ontological insecurities onto powerless minorities, thereby justifying the drift 
towards ideological repression (see also Wacquant, 2009).
One need not presume some form of crude intervention by the powerful in the daily 
workings of the media, nor a continuous behind-the-scenes coordination between the two. 
Attention should rather be paid to institutional structures and the routine professional 
decisions they engender about media values and practices. Journalists, for example, tend to 
internalise priorities and definitions of newsworthiness that conform to long-standing 
institutional habits (see, e.g., Ericson et al., 1987). This is why the role of the media in the 
legitimation of immoralities should be addressed by reference to semiotic aestheticisation, 
more so than by denouncing ‘bias’ and in pursuit of an abstract objectivity. To phrase it 
differently, the question is to examine how the media serve the interests of the powerful by 
operating, not as a tool of propaganda, but as a tool of democracy–a public sphere that 
legitimises the taking of sides without abandoning the principle of objective representation 
and deliberation (Chouliaraki, 2007; see also Lewis, 2004; Solomon, 2006). This should cause 
no dismay to the critical scholar. The aim, in the final analysis, is not to apportion guilt, but to 
reveal all texts of mediation that need to be reversed, if a change for the better is to be 
effectuated. 
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